Elite polarization is at an all-time high. Has this division filtered down into the public, and is this trend being exacerbated by expanded media choice in the post-broadcast era? Using NAES data from recent election cycles, we analyze the influence of news choice on individual-level perceptions of the ideologies of parties and partisan elites. We examine whether cable news choice shapes respondents' ability to correctly identify Democrats as the more liberal party, and Republicans as more conservative. Using cross-sectional and panel data, we find that partisan news consumers-particularly those watching Fox News-are better able to identify the positions and ideologies of partisan elites. Partisan news may help citizens participate more effectively by helping them identify the ideological orientation of the major parties and candidates.
investigate whether partisan cable news clarifies party ideologies and issue positions more than mainstream news, especially given that mainstream news outlets avoid policy analysis (for fear of being accused of bias) and emphasize the game frame and controversies instead (Bennett, 2012; Patterson, 2013) . We find that there are key differences between partisan news watchers, cable news watchers, and non-news watchers in their ability to correctly place parties and their nominees along the ideological spectrum and to correctly identify candidate issue positions.
These findings identify important but previously neglected links between high media choice environments, elite polarization, and the mass public's ability to differentiate between the ideologies and policy positions of the two major parties. These linkages matter for the study of mass partisanship, polarization, and sorting given the emphasis that extant work places on the important role of elite polarization (Hetherington, 2001; Levendusky, 2009; . Our study moves the literature forward by bringing media choice into conversations about elite influence on mass opinion and behavior and bringing the role of political elites into conversations about media choice.
Normatively, our findings suggest a set of democratic tradeoffs: exposure to partisan news and polarized elites produces some negative consequences for the public in terms of polarization and partisan affect, but together they enhance the ability of ordinary citizens to correctly perceive party ideology and policy positions that are genuinely polarized, allowing them to make more informed selections between two very different parties at the ballot box.
Mass Partisanship Then and Now
From the 1980's to the early 2000's, most scholars agreed that mass partisanship was in decline (Nie, Verba, & Petrocik, 1979; Wattenberg, 1984; Konda & Sigelman, 1987; Bartels, RESURGENT MASS PARTISANSHIP REVISITED 4 2000; Hetherington, 2001) . At the same time, party cohesion was reemerging at the elite level (Poole & Rosenthal, 1997; Rohde, 1991) . Hetherington (2001) linked elite-based theories of mass public opinion to growing elite-level polarization, arguing that, "Mass behavior should reflect, at least to some degree, elite behavior … mass party strength should have increased as a result of greater partisanship at the elite level" (p. 619). He demonstrated quite effectively that as elite partisans became more polarized, ordinary citizens were better able to understand party positions-and adjust their own partisan stances accordingly.
Since 2001, elite polarization has only intensified (McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006; Shor & McCarty, 2011) , and the mass public is increasingly polarized along a social dimension.
Partisans' hostility towards the other party has grown more intense and negative over time (e.g. Iyengar et al., 2012) , while partisan bias and anger have substantially increased (Mason, 2015) .
Feeling thermometers show increasing gaps in reported warmth and coldness toward in-party and out-party respondents, and social distance between the parties is growing. For example, between 1960 and 2010, the percent of partisans who report they would be unhappy if their child married a member of the other party increased from five to fifty (Lelkes, 2016) . Evaluations of presidential traits are also polarizing over time (Hetherington et al., 2016) , reflecting that affective and social elements of polarization extend to candidates.
While partisans seem increasingly seem to dislike each other, the policy preferences of most Americans remain somewhat moderate (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008; Fiorina, 2014) . There is consensus that elite polarization is on the rise (Layman, 1999; Stonecash, Brewer, & Mariani, 2003; Layman, Carsey, & Horowitz, 2006) , and that these social and affective forms of animus and distance are increasing among the mass public (Hetherington et al., 2016; Lelkes, 2016) . 1 affect-based and issue or ideology-based measures: affective expressions require less political knowledge. Policy-related measures of ideological polarization may be too complex to be understood by the public, which is why issue-based measures fail to capture it. Researchers simply have an easier time "finding" mass polarization when they use measures citizens can easily express.
If mass polarization is catching up to elite polarization, it could be because cues from polarized elites are being communicated more effectively, giving ordinary Americans a clearer understanding of distinctions between the parties (Levendusky, 2009; Thornton, 2013) . Clarified understanding of party positions facilitates citizens' ability to form more consistent partisan and ideological preferences. If this process holds, the current political environment characterized by extreme elite polarization should facilitate citizens' ability to accurately understand elites' ideological stances and issue positions.
The Media Then and Now
An emerging literature links changes in mass partisanship and polarization to changes in the media environment (e.g. Sunstein, 2001; Stroud, 2010 Stroud, , 2011 Levendusky 2013a Levendusky , 2013b .
Because some indicators of polarization are accelerating simultaneously with ongoing media fragmentation, the bulk of extant research attempts to demonstrate a direct link between media fragmentation and mass polarization, even in the absence of conclusive evidence on this point (see Hopkins and Ladd, 2012 and Prior, 2013 for useful discussions).
Much of this research investigates whether and how the contemporary fragmented media environment is contributing to mass polarization or partisan-ideological sorting, and for good reason (Stroud, 2010 (Stroud, , 2011 Levendusky & Malhotra, 2016) . Media choice has expanded considerably over the past several decades (Groeling, 2013; Prior, 2007 Prior, , 2013 Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013) . Partisan outlets have multiplied, and their content is distinct from that of traditional mainstream news media. Stories from cable outlets such as Fox News reflect a partisan bias, and niche audience targeting based on ideology is also evident in Internet and blog content (Groeling, 2008; Baum & Groeling, 2008; Adamic & Glance, 2005; Hargittai et al., 2008; Prior, 2013) .
There is ample evidence that exposure to partisan cues and messaging can polarize attitudes. Levendusky (2013b) , for example, demonstrates that when individuals are exposed to pro-attitudinal and counter-attitudinal media they become more polarized. Stroud (2010) shows a consistent relationship between selective exposure and mass patterns of polarization, and finds individual-level selective exposure behaviors across a host of media platforms. Increased exposure to messages from partisan news outlets increases polarization, strength of partisan attachments, negative partisan affect, and partisan-ideological sorting (Stroud, 2010 (Stroud, , 2011 Levendusky, 2009 Levendusky, , 2013 Lelkes et al., 2016) . Partisan media messages lead to polarized attitudes, and selective exposure to partisan media increases exposure to those messages.
Along with work on selective exposure, research on the geographic rollout of Fox News reveals an effect on party vote shares (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007) , and that the current media environment does more to reinforce partisanship than to persuade out-partisans (Hopkins and Ladd, 2012) . We contend the clarification of elite differences is a likely mechanism connecting partisan media, polarized elites, and mass polarization. But precisely how does media choice facilitate mass partisanship through the communication of elite cues? Investigating this question requires that we return focus to how elite cues facilitate mass partisanship, especially in the context of the contemporary high choice media environment (e.g. Hetherington, 2001; Levendusky, 2009 
Opinion Change and Party Positioning
There is a consensus in the polarization literature that elite cues play a role in mass partisanship. Elites are solidly and increasingly polarized (McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006; Shor & McCarty, 2011) , and polarization and sorting among the mass public are part of a topdown process where elites polarize first and the mass public follows (Hetherington, 2001; Levendusky, 2009) . Cues from elites help Americans construct and update their partisan identities, and the mass media are the conduits through which elite cues are delivered to the public. Learning the positions of parties or candidates facilitates opinion change through the media: effects previously classified as "priming" are often better described as a partisan learning effect, where partisans learn about differences in parties and elites and adjust their opinions accordingly (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Lenz, 2009 ).
While mainstream media remain tethered to professional norms of journalistic objectivity (Groeling, 2010) , partisan news media convey particularly strong signals about the differences between parties and political elites and the direction of those differences. Partisan cable news outlets rely heavily on congressional partisans at the extreme ends of the ideological spectrum for soundbites and guest appearances (Padgett, 2014) . Regular delivery of strong, polarized partisan cues should increase news consumers' ability to distinguish between the parties.
If elite polarization fosters mass partisanship and sorting by providing clearer distinctions between the two parties, effects of partisan media should be indirect. Levendusky (2009) Levendusky's argument about consistent and high intensity messaging also fits with what we know about how voters process information. Most voters pay only intermittent attention, and only the most intense messages are received and accepted (Zaller, 1992) . Elite partisans therefore sell their messages and partisan brand by repeating themselves in a clear and consistent manner (Tomz & Sniderman, 2005; Groeling, 2010) . Groeling (2010) argues that the journalistic norms and routines of traditional non-partisan media disrupt party clarification by sourcing outside the party, asking questions, and giving equal time to both sides. Hetherington makes a similar argument about the consistency or party messages: "Because greater ideological differences between the parties on the elite level should produce a more partisan information stream, elite polarization should produce a more partisan mass response " (2001: 622) . Party message cohesion should be at its strongest in a partisan media environment.
The current media context provides the opportunity for audiences to self-select into partisan news, mainstream news, or no news, resulting in differential reception of partisan messages. 3 One meaningful way to test the implications of such choices on party clarity is to examine the effect of news choice on the ability to correctly match parties to their ideologies and issue positions. As elite partisans polarize, their cues make it clearer to ordinary Americans that there are key distinctions between them. These cues raise the salience of elites' ideological positions on the right or left, improving the public's ability to array the parties accurately and to discern important differences between the parties altogether. As position, distance, and differences become increasingly clear, the public becomes more concerned about which party dictates policy and partisan attachments become more consequential (Key, 1966; Nie, Verba, & Petrocik, 1979; Page, 1978; Carmines & Stimson, 1989) .
Clearer cues about party ideology should influence perceptions of presidential nominees, who are also likely to be further apart ideologically as the elite polarization trends have (Poole, 2004; Carroll et al., 2008) . As major party nominees differentiate, it should become more straightforward for ordinary citizens to correctly place their ideologies through association with the party that nominated them-and, these distinctions are possibly made even clearer through reinforcement by partisan news media. Building on Hetherington's (2001) arguments, we offer the following hypotheses: H1: Partisan news watchers are more likely to correctly place parties' and presidential candidates' ideologies and issue positions than non-partisan news watchers.
Though we expect partisan news watchers to benefit from the sharpest and most consistent partisan cues (e.g. Levendusky, 2009; Groeling, 2010) , all cable news watchers should be able to place candidates on the ideological spectrum more accurately than non-news watchers.
Mainstream and objective news still contains partisan signals (Padgett, 2014) , as well as information about candidates and their issue positions. News watchers are also more politically interested and informed than those who avoid news (Prior, 2007) . Thus, we expect that those who are interested in news would be more likely to turn their exposure to political information into more accurate ideological placements.
H2: Cable news watchers will be more likely to correctly place parties' and presidential candidates' ideologies and issue positions than non-news watchers.
We also expect that these relationships will be stronger in 2008 
Data and Method
We conduct two analyses to assess these hypotheses. In Analysis 1, we estimate the impact of partisan media choice on perceptions of elites' ideological differences in a model based on Hetherington's (2001) . Previous research demonstrates that partisan selective exposure leads to polarization, with weaker evidence for reverse causality (Stroud 2010) , but no number of covariates in an observational analysis can account for the potential for perceptions of ideological differences between elites to precede the choice to consume partisan media. In Analysis 2, using panel designs to account for selection and reverse causality, we examine the impact of partisan news choice on perceptions of elite ideological differences before and after RESURGENT MASS PARTISANSHIP REVISITED 11 clarifying partisan events: the Democratic National Convention (DNC) and Republican National Convention (RNC) (Romer et al., 2006) . This analysis tests within-person effects of partisan media consumption before and after periods of intense elite messaging, placing our conclusions on firmer causal footing.
Assessing the impact of partisan media usage on perceptions of elite ideological and policy differences requires a dataset that captures media channel choice, opinions towards the parties and their nominees, and individual-level partisanship and ideology. The 2004 and National Annenberg Election Surveys (NAES) asked respondents media use questions for specific newspapers, radio channels, and cable television stations, making the NAES an ideal source for analyzing the role of news choice in public perceptions.
We are unable to rely upon a series of measurements across decades due to the recent emergence of partisan cable news and the paucity of nationally representative surveys with reliable and specific media selection measures. As such, we do not utilize Hetherington's (2001) variables denoting off-year elections, divided government, and differences between the parties' mean DW-NOMINATE scores. There is little variation between the 107 th and 109 th Congresses (those preceding the 2004 and 2008 NAES, respectively). Consistent with the trend observed in Hetherington (2001) , the parties diverged further since his study. In 2004 and 2008, the years studied, the average mean distance between the parties is higher than in any of the years in Hetherington's sample, which ended in 1996. 4 We estimate a partial replication and extension of Hetherington (2001) , absent some dependent variables-seeing important differences between the parties, correctly placing the parties ideologically, and the perceived ideological distance between parties-that are not all available in the NAES datasets. NAES asked about cable news preferences slightly differently: respondents were asked which specific news programs they watched, and we compiled those responses into viewership by network. We coded each network as its own dummy variable, with the "0" term representing viewership of no cable news or any other cable news network. Respondents claiming to watch all three networks equally (around 5% of the sample) are excluded from the analysis.
The control variables are consistent with Hetherington's models. As he describes, strength of partisanship and strength of ideology (coded as dummy variables indicating weak and strong) are important indicators of respondent's understanding of ideology and partisanship and ability to detect differences. Since Hetherington does not include respondents' partisan identification, we exclude this as well, and measure only the intensity of those attachments and beliefs. More education should increase the probability that respondents will perceive differences between the parties (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996) . The age, race, and gender variables account for political experience and important sources of individual-level variation (Mondak, 1999) .
Given the added threat to inference posed by selective exposure, we include other measures of news consumption, civics knowledge, interest in politics, and date interviewed.
Newspaper readership is included to account for exposure to the higher-quality political coverage produced by newspapers (Druckman, 2005) . Exposure to any news on television is also included:
given that viewership of the channels in question (Fox News, MSNBC, and CNN) is explicitly measured, this coefficient will represent the effect of exposure to news on any other channel.
Political interest and political knowledge are also likely to contribute to respondents' ability to correctly place the ideology of political actors. Political interest is captured by asking respondents how closely he or she follows public affairs, coded one to four from "not closely at all" to "very closely." A three-question index of civics knowledge, using several of the questions recommended by Delli Carpini and Keeter (1997), captures knowledge of features of government stored in respondents' long-term memory: which branch of government declares laws constitutional, the proportion of the House needed to overturn a presidential veto, and the current majority party in Congress (Republicans in 2004 and Democrats in 2008) . Using these independent and dependent variables, we examine the impact of partisan news choice on perceptions of elite ideological differences in Analyses 1 and 2.
The equations are analyzed using logistic regression because our dependent variables are binary. In each model, the effect of viewership of Fox News, MSNBC, and CNN are estimated simultaneously. Each coefficient captures the variation accounted for by watching each respective news channel, meaning that the effects of the two other specified networks are not estimated in the coefficient for each network. This estimation strategy results in a common baseline in which the "zero" term for each of the cable news variables is the same: "other" cable news channels (besides the three estimated) and no cable news consumption.
Results

Analysis 1 (Rolling Cross-Section)
Establishing an association between partisan news consumption and correct ideological placement of parties and candidates is a necessary, but not sufficient, step towards confirming our hypotheses. Self-reported media choice and unobserved variables leading to selection bias cannot be overcome as threats to inference, issues we address in the within-subjects panel data in (Stelter, 2008; Stroud, 2010 Correct ideological placement of candidates does not necessarily imply that respondents understand the policy implications of those labels (Converse, 1964; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017 Table 2 , below, with the full results in the Online Appendix (Table A1 ).
[Insert Table 2 
Analysis 2 (Panel Analysis)
Panel analysis allows for within-subjects comparisons, holding individual-level variations constant and generating causal estimates rather than regression-based associations. In a panel design, we should be able to discern the impact of news consumption on interpretation of If respondents' odds of correct ideological placement are greater following the conventions, this within-subjects evidence will bolster the causal validity of our conclusions in Analysis 1. Logit coefficients and odds ratios are presented for the DNC and RNC panels in Table 3 , below.
[Insert Table 3 propensity to discern meaningful differences may be heightened-particularly when the information is less settled in advance.
The large effect of MSNBC viewership shows that our support for H1 is mixed, given MSNBC's relatively neutral stance at the time. Fox News' increased impact relative to CNN, other television stations, and newspapers, however, indicates support for H1; it cannot be disregarded completely. Differences in impressions of the candidates' ideologies from the Democratic convention are influenced by one's viewership of cable news, supporting H2's prediction that cable news consumption-not prior attributes or a higher baseline of learning leading to selection bias-increases respondents' ability to discern candidate ideologies correctly. The absence of significant effects in the RNC panel adds valuable context to these findings, however. Cable news viewership-particularly of partisan news-may be most helpful for differentiating between candidates in their coverage of political events.
Limitations and Future Research
Our analyses reveal that partisan news consumers are more likely to accurately match parties and candidates with their correct ideologies and policy positions, and more likely to learn from coverage of partisan conventions. Though some of the causal questions from Analysis 1 are addressed by the panel data in Analysis 2, we lack random assignment to media availability (as in studies such as Arceneaux et al., 2016) , limiting our certainty in the estimates. Though the DNC analysis shows much larger effects than the RNC analysis, without observation of the exact content around those events, our interpretation must rely upon speculation. Though beyond the scope if this article, a content analysis of MSNBC content surrounding the 2004 DNC, in particular, might shed some light on that substantial coefficient. We plan to include content analyses in future related studies. In order to bolster the evidence we provide here on the clarifying role of partisan news, we also intend to include more elections in future work. Though we include two cycles here, additional elections will allow us to investigate whether these effects persist across variable political contexts and candidate pairings.
Future research should also continue to examine these questions in homogenous social media networks and in emerging online patterns of news consumption. The candidacy and election of Donald Trump provide other potential avenues for future research, given uneasy fit in traditional conceptions of conservatism. Such analyses will depend upon panel data with accurate measures of self-reported media consumption. We recommend that, in the absence of future NAES studies, other major surveys in the discipline adopt similarly detailed media use measures.
Conclusion
Hetherington (2001)'s analysis documents the widening gulf between the parties in the era before the rise of partisan news. Our analysis adds that partisan news helps respondents to correctly perceive those ideological differences, while less partisan outlets like CNN are less effective at conveying this information. Analysis 1 demonstrates the powerful association between watching partisan news and perceptions of real and growing differences between the parties. Analysis 2 demonstrates that these associations are not explained purely by selection effects: partisan and cable news consumption during prominent political events contributes to respondents' ability to differentiate between the candidates, but only when respondents were less familiar with the candidates and their positions.
In the burgeoning literature on media choice and partisan polarization, a few gaps remain (Prior, 2013) . Despite the long-established influence of elites, many media based theories neglect their role. Meanwhile, much of the research articulating a top down influence from elites does not yet incorporate how the contemporary era of high media choice operates in tandem with highly polarized elites. We address these gaps by turning our focus to the important mechanism of partisan ideological differences. Sorting into the correct party ideology requires understanding of which party (and its nominee) represent that ideology. We observe that the so-called partisan media echo chamber effect may operate through its provision of clearer channels of cohesive party messages from polarized elites. Partisan media provide the least diluted partisan messages from our presently polarized elites (Groeling, 2010; Padgett, 2014) .
The literature on selective exposure tends to negatively characterize partisan news and its effects on tolerance, extremity, and civility (Sunstein, 2001; Huckfeldt, Mendez & Osborn, 2004; Gervais, 2014) . Concerns about the polarizing effect of elite partisan extremity are legitimate, but our findings illustrate a positive benefit from partisan news: an improved ability for ordinary
Americans to distinguish between parties that are genuinely polarized. These findings fit with other studies that have found positive effects of partisan media consumption on participation and political engagement (Dilliplane, 2011; Stroud, 2010) . Clarifying, consonant exposure may facilitate political participation by demonstrating easily understandable variation between political options.
On the other hand, our findings only show party clarification benefits for those who selfselect into partisan news. We see smaller effects on learning and ideological accuracy among those who choose non-partisan cable news-in several cases, similar effects to watching no cable news. A substantial portion of the electorate watches no cable news in a high choice media context (Prior, 2007) . Perhaps the benefits we observe from the combined efforts of polarized elites and media choices do not provide Americans with the tools to overcome partisan gridlock, apathy, or growing political dislike across party lines, even as they increase issue position knowledge.
Hetherington ( Views about the good and ills of mass partisanship ebb and flow. Hetherington's (2001) article bookended a time when observers were wringing their hands over the weak state of mass partisanship. Eroding partisanship is intermittently seen as something to worry about, primarily because of its usefulness in structuring political decision-making and conflict. In the present context of elite polarization and high levels of negative partisan affect, anxiety about polarization among elites and the mass public is a major point of discussion among journalists, the punditry, academia and the public. Our study may serve as a useful reminder that elite and mass polarization help voters participate more meaningfully by enabling them to better connect their own preferences and values with those of the parties.
1 Some explanations for persistent differences between elite and mass polarization are based on low levels of political knowledge among the public. Survey-based policy measures used on low interest/low knowledge respondents reflect uncertainty of response rather than truly moderate ideological and partisan positions (Hetherington, Long, and Rudolph 2016) . This is why affectbased measures reflect partisan polarization more than policy based measures and beyond the scope of this paper (though an important subject of future research). We thus adopt cable news channel choice as our measure of partisan news consumption. 6 The measures presented here include "Don't know" responses as incorrect answers, since there are clear differences between the parties at the time of measurement. Results are not substantively different if "Don't know" responses are excluded. 7 We also provide an alternative specification in which we include a standard measure of party ID instead of partisan extremity. Doing so does not significantly change the substantive effects;
it slightly dampens the effect of Fox in the first specification, which has the smallest N. The results for this specification are provided in Table A2 of the online appendix.
8 There was no variation in the "Watches TV news" variable in the 2008 sample, and it was omitted from the analysis for multicollinearity. 9 The convention panels do not contain questions regarding party ideology, only candidate ideology.
10 Random-effects models, another possible estimation strategy, do not control for omitted variables. Results using random effects are not substantially different in any coefficient. Results are available upon request. 
